This chapter surveys a set of papers that analyze strategic intermediation in networks. In all these papers, the architecture of the network, by determining the level of competition and outside options of traders, has an impact on how surplus is shared across trading parties. We emphasize the insights that are most recurrent in the literature.
In the above models, it does not matter to buyers and sellers who intermediates the object, insofar as this does not alter the terms of trade. In Section 3, we relax this restriction and focus on network structure of supply chains more generally. In this case, the value of the object to the final buyers depends on who provides intermediate inputs, and the network describes how inputs from upstream firms can be combined with inputs of downstream firms. 3 Recent work in economics has focused on the optimal allocation of ownership rights along a supply chain, and on stable contracts along supply chains, e.g., Antras and Chor (2013) , Ostrovsky (2008) and Hatfield et al. (2013) . Some other work has focused, instead, on the role that production supply chains play in translating idiosyncratic shocks into volatility at the aggregate level, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2012) . 4 Here, we survey a complementary body of work that studies oligopolistic pricing in competing supply chains. The discussion is based on the work of Choi et al. (2013) and Galeotti and Goyal (2014) .
The models we discuss in Section 2 and Section 3 differ in many aspects, but they generate recurrent equilibrium effects. First, the presence of intermediaries generates new form of inefficiencies when combined with information asymmetries or transaction costs. In particular, trade can occur via a long chain of intermediaries, even if shorter chains are feasible, and so intermediation costs can be too large. However, efficiency is re-established when intermediation stands as the only friction: reselling is sufficient to obtain allocative efficiency in equilibrium.
Second, market power is associated with network positions that give control and access to valuable parts of the networks. Betweenness centrality and variants of it are then adequate network proxies for market power in intermediated markets. These measures differ from classical network measures that have been used to describe power in networks, such as Bonacich and Eigenvector centrality. 5 A corollary of this insight is that intermediaries can increase their market power by merging horizontally, and this comes at the expense of other traders, possibly also located further away from the merging intermediaries.
Finally, in models with complete information, the price at which the object is exchanged is increasing along the supply chain: this is necessary for intermediaries not to make a loss from buying and reselling. In contrast, when each trader's demand for the object is private information, trading conveys information, and the fact that the object remains in the market 3 This also relates to recent work in macroeconomics and international trade on the role of production networks and firm-to-firm trade. The empirics of firm-to-firm trade and some modeling of production networks in macroeconomics are discussed in Chapter XX of the Handbook by Chaney. 4 The effect of networks in translating idiosyncratic shock into volatility at the aggregate level is related to the topic of systemic risk, which is covered in Chapter XX of the Handbook by Acemoglu et al. 5 The literature on network games shows a relation between equilibrium play and Bonacich and Eigenvector centrality. Network games are discussed in Chapter XX of the Handbook by Bramoulle and Kranton. is bad news about its value. This implies that the price at which the object is exchanged decreases over time.
Intermediation
A finite set of traders is located in a directed network and the architecture of the network is common knowledge. A link from trader i to trader j represents the opportunity for i to sell the object to j. Traders can be buyers, sellers or intermediaries. Each seller owns a single indivisible unit of a durable commodity. Buyers have consumption value for the good, whereas sellers and intermediaries wish to maximize their monetary payoff.
The various models that we consider in this section are developed in the context of this general environment, but they differ in terms of the information structure and the trading protocol used to exchange the objects. We first consider a model of bilateral bargaining with random selection of proposer developed by Manea (2013) . Second, we discuss the bilateral bargaining model of , in which each trader has a private value for the object and the seller makes all the offers. We then turn to Kotowski and Leister (2014) , in which a seller uses auctions to bargain with multiple buyers or multiple intermediaries at once and to exploit competition among them. We conclude with a discussion of Blume et al.
(2007) and Gale and Kariv (2009) , in which intermediaries compete by posting bid-and-ask prices. The above papers occupy a central position in our survey, and we discuss related papers as we go along.
To discipline the discussion and to compare the results across models, we focus, when possible, on a specific, yet rich, class of networks. {1, ..., x − 1} are upstream intermediaries. We say that intermediary i in tier x is critical if he is the sole intermediary in that tier. For each tier x, we denote by k x the number of critical downstream intermediaries. The total number of critical intermediaries in a network is denoted by k. The line network is a complete multipartite graph where there is only one intermediary in each tier (see Figure 1(b) ). In a line network, each intermediary is critical.
A competitive network is a complete multipartite network in which there are no critical intermediaries (see Figure 1(a) ).
One exercise that this class of networks allows us to perform is to simulate the effect of horizontal mergers. 6 For a specific trading protocol, we compute the equilibrium outcome in a network in which there are L tiers with respective sizes {n 1 , ..., n L }. We then allow a subset of intermediaries in a tier to merge: they choose their action in order to maximize their joint profits, while all other intermediaries still act to maximize their own individual payoff. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes in these two scenarios, focusing, in particular, on the changes in realized surplus and payoffs.
Bilateral bargaining.
Manea (2013) develops a bilateral bargaining model with complete information, in which a single object is exchanged until it reaches a buyer along one of the possible paths of intermediaries. We now introduce a simplified version of Manea (2013) and discuss equilibrium properties in the class of complete multipartite networks. 7 We assume that there is a single buyer with consumption value v for the good. The bargaining game in the network develops in an infinite number of rounds. Agents discount the future and have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). At the beginning of round t ≥ 0, let agent i in tier x ∈ {0...L} be the owner of the object (s is the owner at 0). Trade in period t develops as follows:
1. The owner i selects a trading partner, say j, among the intermediaries in tier x + 1.
2. With probability p, the owner i makes an offer to j, who decides whether to reject or to accept; with the complementary probability, it is agent j who makes an offer to i. This characterization is based on a decomposition of the network in a sequence of layers.
This sequence is constructed recursively as follows: in layer 0, we first add buyers; then we add all intermediaries linked to at least two buyers; then we add all intermediaries linked to at least two agents already included in layer 0, and so on, until no more intermediaries are added to layer 0. To construct layer 1, we consider only agents that have not been assigned to layer 0. In layer 1, we first add intermediaries who have only one link to intermediaries in layer 0; then we add all intermediaries that have at least two links with intermediaries in layer 1; and we proceed untill we have no more intermediaries to add in layer 1. The algorithm continues until all agents have been allocated to one layer. For example, in Figure   2 .1, the buyer is the only agent in layer 0; intermediary 3 is in layer 2; and all remaining agents are in layer 1. When tier L has more than one intermediary, we are in a bargaining model in which the owner, intermediary i, has multiple potential buyers-all the intermediaries in tier L, each with a resale of pv. Competition across intermediaries in tier L implies that intermediary i extracts all surplus, and so his resale value is pv. Part 1 of the proposition now follows, repeating this argument backwards. It is then straightforward to verify Part 2 and Part 3.
To illustrate the economic contents of Proposition 1, first consider a network in which all traders are arranged in a line (see Figure 1(b) ). In this case, the resale value of intermediaries is ranked according to their distance to the final customer: the closer the intermediary is to the final customer, the higher is his resale value. Furthermore, the equilibrium payoffs of intermediary i are simply (1−p) times the resale value of i, and so the ranking of the equilibrium payoffs across intermediaries is the same as the ranking of their resale values. Finally, 8 The proof of this result for general networks is more involved. To see why, note that a property of complete multipartite networks is that there are no paths connecting intermediaries in the same tier. Hence, whenever a seller in tier x sells to an intermediary in tier x + 1, the continuation payoff of all other intermediaries in tier x + 1 is zero. In richer networks, the current seller may have neighbors i and j, and i and j may be connected via another path, so that intermediary j can still acquire the good after intermediary i has purchased it. We refer to Manea (2013) for the general proof that deals with these subtleties. the equilibrium payoff of the initial seller is decreasing in the number of intermediaries, while the payoff of the final buyer is v(1 − p).
As the bargaining power shifts to upstream traders-i.e., p increases-the payoff of the initial seller increases and the payoff of the final buyer decreases; the seller extracts all the surplus in the limit case where he has full bargaining power-i.e., p → 1. In contrast, the payoff of each intermediary changes non-monotonically with p. It first increases with a shift of bargaining power to upstream traders, and then, eventually, decreases. Interestingly, for moderate values of p, it can be the case that an increase in p increases the payoff of intermediaries who are close to the initial seller, but it decreases the rent for intermediaries that are close to the final customer.
Second, consider a competitive network (see Figure 1a) . In this case, downstream intermediaries always compete for the object owned by the upstream intermediary. Competition at every level of the intermediation network implies that intermediaries have the same limiting resale value, regardless of their specific position. Furthermore, intermediaries obtain zero profit, and the seller and the buyer obtain the same payoff that they would obtain if they were to bargain directly-i.e., the seller obtains pv and the final buyer v(1 − p).
When the network is competitive, horizontal mergers can be very profitable, as they can create substantial market power. For example, if all intermediaries in one tier decide to merge, the sum of their expected payoff would jump from 0 to pv(1 − p), whereas the seller's profits would decrease from pv to p 2 v, ceteris paribus.
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In describing Manea's (2013) framework we have made two important simplifications.
First, we have assumed that there are no transaction costs. In the context of bilateral intermediation, if the seller i has to pay a transaction cost c when trading with j, a classical hold-up problem can emerge, giving rise to inefficiencies. 10 Second, in complete multipartite networks, each intermediary in layer x + 1 is identical from the view point of a seller in tier x. Hence, all paths are equally efficient. However, consider the network in Figure 2 .1, and assume that the final buyer has a valuation of 1 and that each trader has a transaction cost c, which is assumed to be small, but positive. In order to maximize aggregate surplus, the object should flow from the initial seller to the final buyer via the shortest path, from s to b via intermediaries 3 and 4. Instead, as Manea (2013) shows, for a high discount factor, in equilibrium, the seller trades with either intermediary 1 or intermediary 2 and the 9 These conclusions are specific to the competitive network considered here; see Manea (2013) for a more general analysis of horizontal mergers. Manea (2013) also studies vertical mergers.
10 For example, suppose that the seller s is linked to intermediary i, who is linked to final buyer b; suppose, also, that the seller has a transaction cost of c and the valuation of the buyer is v > c. Since the resale value of intermediary i is pv, whenever c > pv, even if there are gains from trade, there is no trade in equilibrium. Wright and Wong (2014) study a similar model on a single chain of traders. 
Bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information
The framework in Section 2.1 makes a neat distinction between buyers and intermediaries, and the consumption value of each trader is common knowledge. propose a model of bilateral bargaining in networks with asymmetric information.
11
All traders are potentially interested in consuming the object, and traders selling the good face incomplete information about the value of potential buyers. This framework is particularly appropriate for studying over-the-counter trading in financial markets, where, depending on private information, such as individual liquidity shocks, traders may buy for taking a certain market position or for reselling to other traders. Another interpretation is one of international trade, in which case the asymmetric information captures information frictions: the tastes of foreigns consumers may be very different from the tastes of domestic consumers.
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More formally, the network is populated by a single initial seller s, and a number of traders, each with either a high consumption value v H , or a low value v L , with 0 < v L < v H .
At the start of the game, the value of a trader is private information and the probability that trader i has high value is π i . The game develops in an infinite number of trading rounds, and traders discount the future at a common rate 1 > δ > 0. In each round, the owner of the object either consumes the object or makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a neighbor of his choosing, who, in turn, decides whether to accept or reject.
Asymmetric information considerably complicates the equilibrium analysis in this model.
Condorelli and Galeotti (2012) provide a characterization of a specific class of stationary equilibria that they call "regular." 13 They show that all regular equilibria take the following form:
a. If the owner of the object has low valuation, he makes a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers to a subset of his neighbors, each at a price that makes a trader with high value indifferent between accepting and rejecting.
b. If all these offers are refused, the owner makes an offer at a price that equals the resale value of the trader receiving the offer. This offer is accepted with probability one by both the high-and low-value trader.
c. When a high-value trader acquires the object, he consumes it; when a low-value trader acquires the object, he resells it.
11 Gofman (2011) builds a reduced-form model of trading in a network in which traders' valuations are private information and each intermediary receives an exogenous share of the gain from trade; the gain from trade is endogenously determined, based on the equilibrium decisions of agents to consume the object or resell it in the neighborhood. 12 The importance of informational frictions in international trade is discussed in Chapter XX of the Handbook by Chaney. 13 Roughly speaking, these are Weak Perfect Markov equilibria in which the strategy of a high-value buyer is constrained to be monotone in the price asked, for a certain region of the price support. d. The game continues in this fashion until a high-value trader acquires the object or a low-value trader decides to consume as the expected value of the object goes below v L .
As an example, suppose that v H = 1, v L = 0, and consider the network in Figure 3; the number in the parentheses indicates the probability that the trader has high value. As agents become perfectly patient, the equilibrium path takes the following form: The initial seller offers the object to trader 1 at his resale value, which is 5/6. Trader 2 accepts and consumes if he has high value; otherwise, he accepts and makes an offer of 1 to trader 2.
Trader 2 accepts if he has a high value and otherwise rejects the offer. Upon rejection, trader 1 offers the object to trader 3 at his resale value, which is 2/3. Trader 3 accepts the offer and consumes if he has a high value; otherwise, he makes an offer of 1 to trader 4. If trader 4 has high value, he accepts and consumes; otherwise, trader 3 consumes.
Two main insights can be derived from this characterization. First, equilibrium asked prices are non-monotone in time: offers at the resale value decline over time, but the price asked between resale offers spikes upward. Offers at the resale value are declining over time because, as offers are rejected, traders learn that there are fewer and fewer potential customers in the network. The fact that prices spike from one resale offer to another reflects the attempt of intermediaries to exploit their local market power: they try to sell at a high price, and if they don't succeed, they lower the price and resell.
14 In the example in Figure 3 , the sequence of prices asked is {5/6, 1, 2/3, 1}.
Second, intermediaries who are essential to connect other intermediaries to the initial seller will make, in expectation, higher expected profits. Since resale offers are declining over time, receiving an offer later in the game allows an intermediary with a high value to obtain a higher profit margin. However, the later that an intermediary receives an offer, the higher is the ex-ante probability that the offer will not materialize, as earlier traders may consume the object. show that the latter effect dominates the former. In the example above, only traders 1 and 3 obtain a positive profit, and their ex-ante expected payoff, condition on having a high value, is 1/6 for trader 1 and 1/9 for trader 3.
Finally, for a given discount factor, it is easy to construct networks in which the equilibrium outcome is inefficient. But, as δ converges to one, in a stationary equilibrium, all offers are either at price v H or at the resale value of a trader, and the equilibrium outcome tends towards the ex-post efficient outcome. This result is in line with many dynamic models of bargaining with one-sided asymmetric information, such as Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985) and Gul, Sonneschein and Wilson (1986).
Multilateral bargaining through auctions
We now move away from bilateral bargaining and consider trading protocols in which the seller more directly exploits competition across buyers. We build on Kotowski and Leister (2014) , where in each round, the owner of the object sells it using a second-price auction.
There is no asymmetric information about the valuation of final buyers, but each intermediary faces a random trading cost from purchasing an object. The trading cost can be either low, which we set equal to 0, or high, in which case it is higher than the consumption value to the buyer. Clearly, an intermediary can never recover a high cost of trade from buying and reselling, and, therefore, high-cost intermediaries will prefer not to trade. An intermediary's cost of trade is private information, and an intermediary has low cost with probability p.
We analyze the model within the class of complete multipartite networks. 15 Trading occurs via a sequence of second-price, sealed-bid auctions: the initial seller s runs an auction in which intermediaries in tier 1 bid; the winner, then, runs an auction in which intermediaries in tier 2 bid; and so on. We assume that the intermediary in the last tier L who eventually owns the object sells it to the final customer at v. Intermediaries can bid any positive price and can also abstain from the auction. Moreover, if only one intermediary makes a positive bid in one of the auctions, then he obtains the object at zero price. For simplicity, agents are assumed to be perfectly patient.
In this model of second-price auction with resale, there can be multiple equilibria. The focus is, then, on equilibria in which agents bid their expected resale value. Formally:
Proposition 2. Consider a complete multipartite network. There is an equilibrium where, in each auction in which the owner is an agent in tier x ∈ {0, ..., L − 1}, high-cost intermediaries in tier x + 1 do not participate in the auction, and low-cost intermediaries in tier x + 1 bid their resale value, which is the asset's expected resale value conditional on all available information. Along the equilibrium path:
1. in the auction where the owner is an agent in tier x ∈ {0, ..., L − 2}, the resale value of each low-cost intermediary in tier x + 1 is
ny−1 is the probability that at least two intermediaries in tier y have a low cost.
The ex-ante expected equilibrium payoff of an intermediary in tier x is
The proof of Proposition 2 follows from the main equilibrium characterization in Kotowski and Leister (2014). To understand the expression for the resale value, consider an intermediary that owns the object and that is located in tier L−1. All bidders in this auction have a resale value of v by assumption and, therefore, will bid v if they have a low cost.
The expected profit of the intermediary owning the object is, then, the probability that at least two bidders have a low cost, δ(n L ), in which case he earns v. Proceeding backwards, we obtain the expression for the resale value.
The ex-ante payoff of an intermediary in tier x is affected by: upstream concentration, horizontal concentration and downstream concentration. First, the higher the number of intermediaries in each upstream tier, the higher the chance that the object will reach tier x−1, which is a necessary condition for an intermediary in tier x to make profit-i.e., first term in the expression. Second, the higher the number of intermediaries in each downstream tier, the higher downstream competition, and the higher the mark-up that the intermediary can obtain by buying and reselling-i.e., the last term in the expression. Finally, an intermediary in tier x is better off when there are fewer intermediaries in his tier, as this improves his terms of trade in the auction-i.e., the middle term in the expression.
Node criticality is also important in this context. In fact, when an intermediary is critical, he will purchase the object at zero price. The market power that critical traders have relative to other intermediaries is, however, confounded by the uncertainty that the object flows along the different tiers and the uncertainty of the level of competition within each tier. By letting the probability that an intermediary has a low cost going to 1, we eliminate these uncertainties and obtain that only critical traders obtain a positive profit.
We now consider the effect of an horizontal merger. We make the natural assumption that the merged set of intermediaries operates at a low cost of trade if at least one of the intermediaries has a low cost.
Corollary 1. Suppose that in a complete multipartite network with tiers of size {n 1 , ..., n L }, a subset of intermediaries of sizen x ≤ n x in tier x ∈ {1, ..., L} merge. By comparing the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2 for the two networks, we obtain that:
1. The horizontal merger does not affect the aggregate expected surplus.
The horizontal merger increases the profit of each merged intermediary, it does not
affect the profit of the other intermediaries in the same tier x or in downstream tiers {x + 1, ..., L}, but it decreases the expected payoff of the intermediaries in upstream tiers {1, ..., x − 1}.
The aggregate surplus generated in equilibrium is v whenever there is at least a trading path of intermediaries, each with a low cost of trade; otherwise, the realized surplus is zero.
The assumption that the merged set of intermediaries operates at a low cost of trade if at least one of the intermediaries has a low cost implies that horizontal mergers do not alter the expected surplus. However, horizontal mergers change the way the surplus is distributed. A merger in tier x reduces competition in that tier, and, therefore, each intermediary in tier
x + 1 anticipates that his resale value has decreased, and this extends to further upstream tiers. 
Multilateral trading with posted bid-and-ask prices.
We now turn to models in which intermediaries set a bid price to buy upstream and an Proposition 3. Consider a complete multipartite network. There exists a Nash equilibrium that is efficient. In every efficient equilibrium:
1. Only critical intermediaries can obtain positive profit.
2. In the line network, all the surplus goes to intermediaries, whereas buyer and seller obtain zero profit. Indeed, any distribution of positive profits across intermediaries that sum up to v can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome.
3. In a competitive network, all the surplus goes to the seller and the buyer, whereas intermediaries obtain zero profit.
The existence of efficient equilibria can be shown by construction. Consider the following bid/ask profile: each intermediary in tier x = 2...L bids v and asks v; if there is only one intermediary in tier 1 then the intermediary bids 0 and asks v, if there is more than one intermediary in tier 1, then each intermediary bids v and asks v. Under this profile, if an intermediary acquires the object, he will resell it to v. So, each intermediary is willing to bid up to v. Since each intermediary asks v, for every intermediary in tier x > 1, it is a best reply to bid v. A monopoly intermediary in tier 1 will bid 0, while if there are multiple intermediaries, competition will push bids up to v.
In the line network, the intermediary connected to the seller has full bargaining power and will extract all the resale value that his connection generates; similarly, the intermediary connected to the final customer also has full bargaining power, and so must also extract all the surplus from the buyer. Equilibrium does not pin down, however, how the total surplus v is distributed across intermediaries. In fact, the problem faced by two consecutive intermediaries, x and x + 1, is akin to a Nash demand game where, though, the surplus that can be shared is endogenous and depends on the resale value of intermediary x + 1. In a competitive multipartite network, competition across intermediaries at every level destroys intermediation rents, and the seller is the sole agent extracting all the surplus. As in the models we have analyzed previously, intermediaries who merge horizontally may increase their market power.
Gale and Kariv (2009) provide an experimental analysis of this model that focuses on competitive networks. They find that, after a period of learning, the bid-and-ask prices converge to the competitive equilibrium prices, and the outcome of trade becomes efficient.
So, despite trade requiring possibly long chains of intermediaries, and the impossibility of recontracting, subjects are often able to coordinate on the efficient outcome. The experiment also points out that higher levels of competition across intermediaries, studied by increasing the number of intermediaries in different tiers, tend to speed up the learning and convergence towards efficient play. 17 
Static trading protocols
In all the papers we have surveyed so far, the market model contains an element of sequentiality, with sellers (or buyers) usually proposing the terms of trade and one or more buyers (or the seller) agreeing to trade according to their terms or refusing to trade. We now discuss three papers that, while maintaining that not everyone can trade with everyone else, exploit a more centralized/static equilibrium notion.
Nava ( Babus and Kondor (2013) consider a setup closely related to that of Malamud and Rostek (2013) . They focus on a less general connectivity structure, but they endow agents with idiosyncratic information on the asset's value and characterize the informational content of 17 We refer to Chapter XX of the Handbook by Choi and Kariv for a detailed survey of experiments of networked markets. That chapter includes, among other related papers, an exhaustive discussion of Gale and Kariv (2009) and of Choi et al. (2013) .
prices. They show that information diffusion is effective, but not informationally efficient.
They also show that dealers with more trading partners are ex post better informed, so they tend to trade and intermediate more, and earn more profit per transaction.
Pricing in supply chains
Section 2 focuses on pure intermediation: the role of intermediaries is to buy and resell assets, and assets flow from sellers to final customers. However, one can envisage an environment in which a chain of intermediaries is a final product, and the value of consumers for different paths may depend on the particular intermediaries within the path. The framework developed in this section, due to Choi et al. (2013) and Galeotti and Goyal (2014) , abstracts from the role of idiosyncratic shocks in the value chain and from the endogenous formation of these networks. It complements the literature on supply chains by providing a systematic study of strategic pricing in competing chains. This work is also related to Ozdgar (2007a, 2007b) , who study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in congested markets, such as network flows in communication networks or traffic in transportation networks.
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Let T be the set of directed paths connecting s to b in a complete multipartite network.
Following Galeotti and Goyal (2014) , we use a Dixit-Stiglitz framework to model paths as differentiated products that buyers may demand, see, also, Singh and Vives (1984) . Let p i be the price for the service of intermediary i and let p = {p 1 , ..., p n } denote a price profile.
The cost of a path q ∈ T is the sum of prices charged by the intermediaries along that pathi.e., c(q; p) = i∈q p i . A representative consumer has quadratic utility over paths. That is, let x q be the consumption of a representative consumer for path q ∈ T , and let
Then, the representative consumer maximizes U =Û − q∈T c(q; p)x q , where β > 0 and γ ∈ [0, β). Solving for optimum consumption leads to the following demand function for path q:
where m is the total number of paths-i.e., m ≡ |T |. When γ = 0 paths are independent goods, when γ > 0 paths are substitute goods and, at the limit, when γ → β, we have the case where paths are perfect substitutes. We report the Nash equilibrium of the following simultaneous move game: intermediaries set prices simultaneously and wish to maximize their individual profits, where intermediary i's profits is Π i (p) = p i q∈T,i∈q D(p, q).
The strategic relation between two intermediaries depends on their network location, together with the intensity of competition across paths. If intermediaries i and j share path q, then an increase in intermediary i's price decreases the demand of path q, and this creates incentives for intermediary j to decrease his price. So, sharing paths create strategic substitutability between intermediaries' pricing strategy. In contrast, if intermediary i is located in path q and intermediary j is located in path q , an increase in intermediary i's price decreases the competitiveness of path q relative to path q , and intermediary j can then raise his profits by increasing his price. Hence, belonging to different paths creates strategic complementarities between intermediaries' pricing strategy. As intermediaries may share some paths and not others, whether the prices of two intermediaries are strategic complements or strategic substitutes will depend on their specific network location.
The following result provides a characterization of equilibrium pricing and profits across intermediaries in complete multipartite networks. The betweenness centrality of intermediary i is the ratio between the number of paths that i belongs to and the total number of paths.
In a complete multipartite network, the total number of trading paths is m = Π l x=1 n x and an intermediary in tier y belongs to Π l x=1,x =y n x . Therefore, the betweenness centrality of an intermediary in tier y is simply 1/n y . Proposition 4. Consider a complete multipartite network. In equilibrium, the price and profit of an intermediary in tier x is higher than the price and profit of an intermediary in tier y if, and only if, the betweenness centrality of an intermediary in tier x is higher than the betweenness centrality of an intermediary in tier y.
The result illustrates that betweenness centrality is an important determinant of market power for intermediaries. Betweenness centrality is formally related to the notion of node criticality. In fact, a node i is critical if, and only if, has maximal betweenness centrality.
When paths are imperfect substitute products, intermediaries enjoy rent even if they are not critical. As the next result illustrates, when paths become perfect substitutes, then only critical intermediaries charge a positive mark-up and obtain positive profits. Proposition 5. At the limit, where paths become perfect substitutes-i.e., γ → β-the equilibrium price of each non-critical intermediary goes to 0, and the equilibrium price of each critical intermediary goes to
where k is the number of critical intermediaries. Hence, only critical intermediaries obtain positive profit. an outcome is stable if no firm would like to break any of its relationships or establish a new one with a willing partner. Ovstrosky (2008) develops conditions on preferences that assure the existence of stable outcomes. These conditions generalize the gross-substitute condition in Kelso and Crawford (1982) . Insights of two-sided matching theory-e.g., Adachi (2000) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) -generalize besides existence: stable outcomes represent a lattice in the payoff space of firms at the top of the network-i.e., suppliers-and firms at the bottom-i.e., consumers. The generality of the model does not allow, though, to derive specific insights into the effect of the network structure on outcomes. 19 
Discussion and open questions
We conclude by discussing open questions in the literature. All the models discussed in Section 2 assume that there is only one seller with only one unit of the good. Extending the analysis to multiple units, heterogeneous supplies and heterogeneous demands can be a fruitful area for future research.
We have focused our attention on strategic intermediation in a given network and ab- The models we presented provide rich empirical predictions with respect to how the architecture of the network impacts efficiency, pricing, and distribution of economic surplus across traders. We discussed two recent experimental works on intermediation networks, i.e.,
Gale and Kariv (2009) and Choi et al. (2013) . Both experiments exploit the simultaneous move nature of these two models, and, therefore, they abstract away from the possibility of re-contracting among intermediaries. We believe that adding a dynamic aspect to these experiments can be useful to evaluate the insights that the theory provides on intermediation in networks.
Finally, it is well known that bargaining games are sensitive to the specification of the extensive form-i.e., the trading protocol. This is even more so when there are more than two bargaining parties as in intermediation networks. Understanding optimal trading protocols from the perspective of the various actors involved in the network is an open research agenda.
